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Abstract—Encrypting data before sending it to the cloud
protects it against hackers and malicious insiders, but requires
the cloud to compute on encrypted data. Trusted (hardware)
modules, e.g., secure enclaves like Intel’s SGX, can very efficiently
run entire programs in encrypted memory shielding it from the
administrator’s view. However, it already has been demonstrated
that software vulnerabilities give an attacker ample opportunity
to insert arbitrary code into the program. This code can then
modify the data flow of the program and leak any secret in the
program to an observer in the cloud via SGX side-channels. Since
any larger program is rife with software vulnerabilities, it is not
a good idea to outsource entire programs to an SGX enclave.
A secure alternative with a small trusted code base would
be fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) – the holy grail of
encrypted computation. However, due to its high computational
complexity it is unlikely to be adopted in the near future. As a
result researchers have made several proposals for transforming
programs to perform encrypted computations on less powerful
encryption schemes. Yet, current approaches fail on programs
that make control-flow decisions based on encrypted data. In
this paper, we introduce the concept of data flow authentication
(DFAuth). DFAuth prevents an adversary from arbitrarily devi-
ating from the data flow of a program. Hence, an attacker cannot
perform an attack as outlined before on SGX. This enables that
all programs, even those including operations on control-flow
decision variables, can be computed on encrypted data.
We implemented DFAuth using a novel authenticated homo-
morphic encryption scheme, a Java bytecode-to-bytecode com-
piler producing fully executable programs, and SGX enclaves.
We applied DFAuth to an existing neural network that performs
machine learning on sensitive medical data. The transformation
yields a neural network with encrypted weights, which can be
evaluated on encrypted inputs in 0.86 seconds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many critical computations are being outsourced to the
cloud. However, attackers might gain control of the cloud
servers and steal the data they hold. End-to-end encryption
is a viable security countermeasure, but requires the cloud to
compute on encrypted data.
Trusted (hardware) modules, e.g., secure enclaves such as
Intel’s SGX [6], [25], [34], promise to solve this problem.
An SGX enclave can very efficiently run an entire program
in encrypted memory shielding it from the administrator’s
view. However, it already has been demonstrated that soft-
ware vulnerabilities give an attacker ample opportunity to
insert arbitrary code into the program [32]. These attacks are
called return-oriented programming (ROP) and piece together
programs from code snippets before return statements in the
actual program. Since any larger program is rife with software
vulnerabilities, it is hence not a good idea to outsource entire
programs to an SGX enclave. The inserted code can modify
the control and data flow of the program and leak any secret in
the program to an observer in the cloud via SGX side-channels
[13], [33], [38].
In particular, consider the following data flow modification
attack that efficiently leaks a secret x in its entirety. We
assume an encrypted variable Enc(x) in the domain [0, N−1]
is compared to N/2 − 1. The “then” branch is taken if it
is lower or equal; the “else” branch otherwise. This can
be observed, for example, by the branch shadowing attack
presented in [33]. The observation of this behaviour leaks
whether x ≤ N/2− 1. This becomes quite problematic when
assuming a strong, active adversary that can modify the control
and data flow. The adversary may then create constants Enc(x¯)
for x¯ ∈ {N/4, N/8, N/16, . . . , 1} in the encrypted code,
add those to the variable Enc(x) and re-run the control-flow
branch. This way, by consecutively adding or subtracting the
constants, the adversary can conduct a binary search for the
encrypted value.
As a defence for this attack (of modifying the data flow), we
introduce the concept of data flow authentication (DFAuth).
We equip each control-flow decision variable with a label
(loosely speaking: a message authentication code), such that
only variables with a pre-approved data flow can be used in the
decision. Variables carry unique identifiers that are preserved
and checked during the encrypted operations. This prevents
an adversary from deviating from the data flow in ways that
would allow attacks such as the one we mentioned before.
Note that a program may still have intentional leaks introduced
by the programmer. However, DFAuth restricts the leakage of
any program to these intended leaks by the programmer which
the programmer could avoid by using appropriate algorithms
such as data-oblivious ones. In essence, the technique restricts
the information flows to those that are equivalent to the
original program’s information flows. We give a definition in
Section III.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [20] would be an-
other alternative to compute on encrypted data without leaks.
Due to its disappointing performance [21], researchers are
seeking efficient alternatives that offer similar security. For-
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tunately, we know how to efficiently perform additively and
multiplicatively homomorphic operations on encrypted data.
Furthermore, if we reveal the control flow of a program
(instead of computing a circuit), efficient computation seems
feasible. Note that any control flow decision on an encrypted
variable is an intentional leak by the programmer. Several
proposals for program transformation into such encrypted
computations have been made. MrCrypt [41], JCrypt [15] and
AutoCrypt [42] each offer an increasing set of programs that
can be computed on encrypted data. To support encrypted
computation on all programs, however, one needs to convert
between different homomorphic encryption schemes. These
conversions are very small routines, such that we can scrutinize
their code and implement them safely in a Trusted Module
likely without any software vulnerabilities.
In this way we combine the benefits of partially homomor-
phic encryption with a small code base and the efficiency of
unprotected program execution. Our re-encryption modules are
small and program-independent and are run protected in the
SGX enclave whereas the program runs efficiently on homo-
morphic encrypted values in unprotected memory. We take
care not to destroy the benefits of outsourcing. The verification
of labels is constant time and does not dependent on the
homomorphic computation. To this end we introduce our own
authenticated homomorphic encryption scheme HASE.
We implemented the program transformation in a bytecode-
to-bytecode compiler, such that the resulting programs are
executable. We evaluate DFAuth based on two applications:
a checkout (shopping cart) component of a sales application
and a neural network performing evaluations on sensitive
medical data. The transformed applications execute in 2.3 ms
and 0.86 s, respectively. This shows that DFAuth is practically
deployable, although it provides extensive security guarantees.
In summary, our contributions are:
• We define the concept of data flow authentication and
show its interference equivalence property in a program
dependency graph.
• We present a new authenticated homomorphic encryption
scheme HASE, which can be used for constant time
implementation of data flow authentication.
• We implemented and evaluated a bytecode-to-bytecode
program transformation for computation on encrypted
data using data flow authentication.
• We implemented and evaluated transformed programs,
e.g., machine learning, using Intel’s SGX.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section,
we provide our adversary model and various definitions of
our authenticated homomorphic encryption scheme HASE
required in subsequent sections. In Section III, we introduce
data flow authentication DFAuth and the security it provides.
Section IV presents our HASE constructions and discusses
their security. Details about our implementation in Java are
given in Section V and Section VI shows the results of our
evaluation using this implementation. Section VII presents
related work before Section VIII concludes our work.
Client
Server (Untrusted) 
Controlled by 
Adversary
Trusted ModuleA. Generate Keys
B. Compile Program
C. Deploy Program 
(Remote Attestation)
1. Encrypt Inputs 2. Send Ciphertexts
3. Execute Program
4. Send (Encrypted) Result
5. Verify Result
Figure 1. System Overview
II. DEFINITIONS
In order to understand the security of data flow authentica-
tion, we first define the overall adversary model we consider,
the algorithms that HASE offers and the security it guarantees.
A. Adversary Model
We consider a scenario between a trusted client and an
untrusted cloud server, which has a Trusted Module, e.g., an
Intel SGX enclave. Figure 1 depicts the process and its trust
boundaries. The client wishes to execute a program at the
cloud server with sensitive input data. Our security objective
is to leak only the information about the inputs to the cloud
server that can be inferred from the program’s executed control
flow.
We distinguish two phases of this outsourced computation:
setup and runtime. First, the client chooses the keys for the
encryption of its inputs in our HASE encryption scheme
(A). Then the client transforms the intended program using
a specialized HASE-enabled compiler and uploads it to the
cloud (B). The server deploys some parts of the program
into the Trusted Module which the client verifies by remote
attestation (C). This concludes the setup phase.
In the runtime phase, the client can execute – multiple times
if it wishes – the program on inputs of its choice. It (1)
encrypts the inputs using the information from the compiled
program and (2) sends the ciphertexts to the cloud server. The
cloud server now (3) executes the program. We assume an
active adversary controlling the cloud. The adversary can
• read the contents of all variables and the program text
(except in the Trusted Module).
• modify the contents of all variables and the program
(except in the Trusted Module).
• continuously observe and modify the control flow, e.g.,
by breaking the program, executing instructions step-by-
step and modifying the instruction pointer (except in the
Trusted Module).
• do all of this arbitrarily interleaved.
After the execution of the program the server (4) returns an
encrypted result to the client. The client can then (5) verify
the result of the computation.
We ensure the following security property: The server
has learnt nothing beyond the intended information flow of
the program to unclassified memory locations (interference
equivalence1).
B. Notation
To denote an object whose members can be unambiguously
accessed individually we write 〈. . .〉. We use . to access
object members, for example O.A() refers to an invocation
of algorithm A on object O.
We use := for deterministic variable assignments and = for
comparisons. To indicate that an output of some algorithm may
not be deterministic we use ← instead of := in assignments.
We write x←$X to sample x uniformly at random from a set
X .
For m,n ∈ N,m < n we use [m,n] to refer to the set of
integers {m, . . . , n}. For a k-tuple x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) we
refer to the projection of x onto its i-th (i ∈ [1, k]) component
as pii(x) := xi. Similarly, for a set of k-tuples S we define
pii(S) := {pii(x) : x ∈ S}.
We follow the established convention of writing the group
operation of an abstract group multiplicatively. Consequently,
exponentiation refers to a repetition of the group operation. We
may refer to a group (G, ·) simply as G if the group operation
is clear from the context.
Throughout the document λ denotes a security parameter
and 1λ refers to the unary encoding of λ. The abbreviation PPT
stands for probabilistic polynomial time. A function f : N→
R+ is called negligible in n if for every positive polynomial
p there is an n0 such that for all n > n0 it holds that f(n) <
1/p(n).
To indicate that some algorithm A is given black-box access
to some function F we writeAF . Each parameter to F is either
fixed to some variable or marked using · denoting that A may
freely choose this parameter.
C. Game-Based Security
We provide security definitions as games (security experi-
ments) played between a PPT challenger and a PPT adversary
A [9]. The result of the game is 1 if A wins the game (i.e.,
breaks security) and 0 otherwise. A’s advantage is defined as
the probability of A winning the game minus the probability of
trivially winning the game (e.g., by guessing blindly). Security
holds if no adversary has non-negligible advantage. The proof
is achieved by reducing the winning of the game to some
problem that is assumed to be hard.
We perform security reductions using a sequence of games.
The first game is the original security experiment provided
by the security definition. Each subsequent game is equal to
the previous game except for some small well-defined change
for which we argue that it does only negligibly influence
adversarial advantage. The last game then has a special and
easy to verify property, e.g., the adversary has no advantage
over a blind guess. Only negligible change in advantage
1See Section III for a formal definition.
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Figure 2. HASE Overview
between subsequent games implies only negligible change in
advantage between the first and the last game, which concludes
the reduction.
D. Homomorphic Authenticated Symmetric Encryption
(HASE)
In this section, we discuss the syntax, correctness and secu-
rity of a HASE scheme. For security we define confidentiality
in terms of indistinguishability and authenticity in terms of
unforgeability. Indistinguishability of HASE schemes (HASE-
IND-CPA) is defined as an adaptation of the commonly
used IND-CPA security definition for symmetric encryption
schemes [29]. Unforgeability of HASE schemes (HASE-UF-
CPA) is based on the common unforgeable encryption defini-
tion [29].
Definition 1 (HASE Syntax). A HASE scheme is a tuple of
PPT algorithms 〈Gen,Enc,Eval,Der,Dec〉 such that:
• The key-generation algorithm Gen takes the security
parameter 1λ as input and outputs a key pair 〈ek, sk〉
consisting of a public evaluation key ek and a secret key
sk. The evaluation key implicitly defines a commutative
plaintext group (M,⊕), a commutative ciphertext group
(C,⊗) and a commutative label group (L, ).
• The encryption algorithm Enc takes a secret key sk, a
plaintext message m ∈ M and an identifier i ∈ I as
input and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• The evaluation algorithm Eval takes an evaluation key ek
and a set of ciphertexts C ⊆ C as input and outputs a
ciphertext cˆ ∈ C.
• The deterministic label derivation algorithm Der takes a
secret key sk and a set of identifiers I ⊆ I as input and
outputs a secret label l ∈ L.
• The deterministic decryption algorithm Dec takes a secret
key sk, a ciphertext c ∈ C and a secret label l ∈ L as
input and outputs a plaintext message m ∈ M or ⊥ on
decryption error.
An overview of all operations involved in our HASE en-
cryption scheme is provided in Figure 2.
Definition 2 (HASE Correctness). Let Π be a HASE scheme
consisting of five algorithms as described above. Furthermore,
let
S := {(m, i) : m ∈M, i ∈ I}
be a set of plaintexts with unique identifiers and let I := pi2(S)
be the set of identifiers in S. We say that Π is correct if for
any honestly generated key pair 〈ek, sk〉 ← Π.Gen(1λ) and
any set of ciphertexts
C := {c : c← Π.Enc(sk,m, i) : (m, i) ∈ S}
it holds that
Π.Dec(sk,Π.Eval(ek, C),Π.Der(sk, I)) =
⊕
(m,i)∈S
m
except with negligible probability over 〈ek, sk〉 output by
Π.Gen(1λ).
Note that when S is a singleton set, i.e., we have S :=
{(m, i)}, I := {i}, l := Π.Der(sk, I) and C := {c} for
some c ← Π.Enc(sk,m, i), we expect Π.Eval(C) to return
c and the last equation in the above definition boils down to
Π.Dec(sk, c, l) = m.
Definition 3 (HASE-IND-CPA). A HASE scheme Π has
indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen-plaintext attack,
or is CPA-secure, if for all PPT adversaries A there is a
negligible function negl(λ) such that
AdvIND-CPAA,Π (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpHASEIND-CPAA,Π (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
≤ negl(λ)
The experiment is defined as follows:
ExpHASEIND-CPAA,Π (λ)
S := {}
〈ek, sk〉 ← Π.Gen(1λ)
〈m0,m1, i, st〉 ← AEsk (1λ, ek)
if i ∈ pi2(S) then
return 0
else
b←$ {0, 1}
S := S ∪ {(mb, i)}
c← Π.Enc(sk,mb, i)
b′ ← AEsk (1λ, c, st)
return b = b′
Esk(m, i)
if i ∈ pi2(S) then
return ⊥
else
S := S ∪ {(m, i)}
c← Π.Enc(sk,m, i)
return c
The differences to symmetric encryption are as follows: We
removed the explicit requirement that m0 and m1 need to
be of the same bit length because we consider plaintexts to
be elements of some group (M,⊕) rather than bit strings.
The extra identifier parameter to the encryption algorithm is
incorporated by allowing the adversary to submit an additional
identifier argument to encryption oracle queries. Additionally,
the adversary is allowed to pick the identifier used for the
encryption of the challenge plaintext mb.
Definition 4 (HASE-UF-CPA). A HASE scheme Π is unforge-
able under a chosen-plaintext attack, or just unforgeable, if for
all PPT adversaries A there is a negligible function negl(λ)
such that
AdvUF-CPAA,Π (λ) := Pr
[
ExpHASEUF-CPAA,Π (λ) = 1
]
≤ negl(λ)
with the experiment defined as follows:
ExpHASEUF-CPAA,Π (λ)
S := {}
〈ek, sk〉 ← Π.Gen(1λ)
(c, I)← AEsk (1λ, ek)
l := Π.Der(sk, I)
m := Π.Dec(sk, c, l)
m˜ :=
⊕
(m′,i)∈S,i∈I
m′
return m 6= ⊥ ∧m 6= m˜
Esk(m, i)
if i ∈ pi2(S) then
return ⊥
else
S := S ∪ {(m, i)}
c← Π.Enc(sk,m, i)
return c
The challenger invokes Π.Gen to generate a key pair and
provides the evaluation key to the adversary. The adversary is
given access to an encryption oracle which on input a message
and an identifier outputs a corresponding ciphertext produced
using Π.Enc and the secret key. The oracle enforces unique-
ness of the identifier by keeping track of all queried plaintext-
identifier pairs. It rejects any encryption query involving a
previously used identifier.
At some point the adversary outputs a ciphertext and a set
of identifiers. The adversary wins if the returned ciphertext
is a valid forgery with respect to the set of identifiers. This
is the case if and only if two conditions are met. First, the
ciphertext has to successfully decrypt under the label derived
from the set of identifiers returned by the adversary. Second,
the resulting plaintext must be different from the plaintext
resulting from the application of the plaintext operation to the
set of plaintexts corresponding to the set of identifiers returned
by the adversary.
III. DATA FLOW AUTHENTICATION (DFAUTH)
We introduce DFAuth using an example. Consider the
following excerpt from a Java program:
1 a = b + c;
2 d = a * e;
3 if (d > 42)
4 f = 1;
5 else
6 f = 0;
First, DFAuth performs a conversion to single static assign-
ment (SSA) form [5]: assign each variable at exactly one code
location; create atomic expressions; introduce fresh variables
if required. In the example, DFAuth changes the program to
the following:
1 a = b + c;
2 d = a * e;
3 d1 = d > 42;
4 if (d1)
5 f1 = 1;
6 else
7 f2 = 0;
8 f = phi(f1,f2);
As usual in SSA, phi is a specially interpreted merge
function that combines the values of both assignments to f,
here denoted by f1 and f2.
DFAuth then performs a type inference similar to JCrypt
[15] and AutoCrypt [42]. As a result of this inference, each
variable and constant is assigned an encryption type of {add,
mul, cmp}. At runtime, each constant and variable value will
be encrypted according to the appropriate type. Our HASE
encryption implements multiplicative homomorphic encryp-
tion mul and its operations directly, while it implements
additive homomorphic encryption add using exponentiation.
Comparisons cmp are implemented in the Trusted Module.
Our experiments show that this is more efficient than per-
forming the comparison in the program space using conversion
to searchable or functional encryption. An attacker observing
user space will hence only see encrypted variables and con-
stants, but can observe the control flow. Actual data values are
hidden from the attacker.
Combinations of multiple operations, however, require addi-
tional work. Every time a variable is encrypted in one encryp-
tion type (e.g., additive), but is later used in a different one
(e.g., multiplicative), DFAuth must insert a conversion. The
resulting program in our running example looks as follows:
Listing 1. Example as executed on the server
1 a = b + c;
2 a1 = convertToMul(a, "a1");
3 d = a1 * e;
4 d1 = convertToCmpGT42(d, "d1");
5 if (d1)
6 f1 = 1;
7 else
8 f2 = 0;
9 f = phi(f1,f2);
The first conversion is necessary because the variable a must
be converted from additive to multiplicative homomorphic en-
cryption. The resulting re-encrypted value is stored in a1. For
security reasons, the decryption performed by the conversion
routine must be sensitive to the variable identifier it is assigned
to. A unique label must be introduced to make the decryption
routine aware of the code location. DFAuth can use the left-
hand-side variable’s identifier ("a1" in this example), because
it introduced unique names during SSA conversion. Using
this variable identifier, the conversion routine can retrieve the
corresponding label of the HASE encryption stored in the
memory protected by the Trusted Module.
Any branch condition is also treated as a conversion that
leaks the result of the condition check. In the example, DFAuth
introduces the variable d1 to reflect this result:
4 d1 = convertToCmpGT42(d, "d1");
To simplify the exposition, we assume that our com-
piler inlines this comparison into a special routine
convertToCmpGT42. In the general case, a binary compari-
son on two variables x and y would result in a call to a routine
convertToCmp(x,y,"z"). We show the full algorithm in
Listing 4 in Section V which is generic for all comparisons
and in case of comparison to a constant looks this constant up
in an internal table protected by the Trusted Module. We need
to protect constants in comparisons, since if they were part of
the program text, they could be modified by the adversary.
As mentioned before, the security challenge of such con-
versions to cmp is that they leak information about the
encrypted variables, and particularly that active adversaries
that can modify the control and data flow can exploit those
leaks to restore the variables’ plaintext. In this paper, we
thus propose to restrict the data flow using DFAuth. It allows
such conversions in a secure way by enforcing that encrypted
variables can be decrypted only along the program’s original
data flow. The approach comprises two steps. First, happening
at compile time, for each conversion DFAuth precomputes the
Der function on the operations in the code. In the conversion
convertToMul(a, "a1") (at line 2 in our example),
DFAuth computes the label
l2 = Der(sk, {"b","c"})
and in the conversion at line 4
l4 = Der(sk, {"a1","e"})
Here the second argument to Der is the multi-set of variable
identifiers involved in the unique computation preceding the
conversion. (We use a multi-set and not a vector, because
all our encrypted operations are commutative.) The compiler
computes labels for all variables and constants in the program.
At runtime the computed labels as well as the secret key
sk are both kept secret from the attacker, which is why both
are securely transferred to, and stored in, the Trusted Module
during the setup phase. The Trusted Module registers the secret
labels under the respective identifier, for example, associating
the label l4 with the identifier "d1".
All conversion routines run within the Trusted Module.
They retrieve a secret label for an identifier with the help
of a labelLookup(id) function. In particular, when the
program runs and a conversion routine is invoked, the Trusted
Module looks up and uses the required labels for decryption.
In the example at line 4, the call to convertToCmpGT42 in-
ternally invokes the decryption operation Dec(sk, d, l4)
using secret label l4 retrieved for variable identifier "d1":
1 convertToCmpGT42(d, "d1") {
2 l4 = labelLookup("d1");
3 x = Dec(sk, d, l4);
4 if (x == fail)
5 stop;
6 return (x > 42);
7 }
Note that in this scheme, the Trusted Module returns the
result of the comparison in the clear. In this case, however,
leaking the branch decision is secure, as the HASE encryption
scheme guarantees that any active attack that would yield the
adversary a significant advantage will be reliably detected.
Let us assume an attacker that attempts to modify the
program’s data or control flow to leak information about the
encrypted plaintexts, for instance, using a binary search like
we described in the introduction. The attacker is not restricted
to the compiled instructions in the program, and can also try
to “guess” the result of cryptographic operations as the adver-
sary in experiment ExpHASEIND-CPAA,Π . This modification to
binary search can only succeed if the decryption operations
Dec in convertToCmpGT42 (or other conversion routines)
succeed. The adversary can minimize the Dec operations, e.g.,
by not introducing new calls to conversion routines, but given
the scheme defined above, any attempt to alter the data flow
on encrypted variables will cause Dec to fail: Assume that
an attacker inserts code in Listing 1 to search for the secret
value d (resulting code shown in Listing 2). We only use this
code to illustrate potential attacks and ignore the fact that the
attacker would need access to the encrypted constants (2^i)
and needs to guess the result of the homomorphic addition
operation on the ciphertexts. However, given these capabilities,
the attacker could try to observe the control flow – simulated
by our statement leak(f) – which then would in turn leak
the value of d.
Listing 2. Example modified by the attacker
1 a = b + c;
2 a1 = convertToMul(a, "a1");
3 g1 = a1 * e; //changed
4 for(i = n..1) { //inserted
5 g = phi(g1, g3); //inserted
6 d = g + 2^i; //inserted
7 d1 = convertToCmpGT42(d, "d1");
8 if (d1) {
9 f1 = 1;
10 g2 = g3 - 2^i; //inserted
11 } else
12 f2 = 0;
13 g3 = phi(g, g2); //inserted
14 f = phi(f1,f2);
15 leak(f); //inserted
16 }
This code will only execute if each variable decryption suc-
ceeds, but decryption for instance of d1 will succeed only if
it was encrypted with the same label l4 that was associated
with d1 at load time. Since the Trusted Module keeps secret
the labels themselves, and also the secret key sk to compute
labels, the attacker cannot possibly forge the required label
at runtime. Moreover, in the attacker-modified program, the
encryption must fail due to the altered data dependencies: in
the example, the input d to convertToCmpGT42 has now
been derived from g3 and i instead of a1 and e, which leads
to a non-matching label for d. In result, the decryption in the
conversion routine convertToCmpGt42 will fail (in this
specific attack even at the first comparison) and stop program
execution before any unintended leakage can occur.
More generally, the way in which we derive labels from
data-flow relationships enforces a notion of interference equiv-
alence.
Definition 5 (Non-interference). Generally, a program P is
said to be non-interferent, if applied to two different memory
configurations M1,M2 that are equal w.r.t. their low, i.e.,
unclassified memory locations, M1,=L M2 for short, then
also the resulting memory locations must show such low-
equivalency: P (M1),=L P (M2). Non-interference holds if
and only if there is no information flow from high, i.e.,
classified values to low memory locations. While this is a
semantic property, previous research has shown that one can
decide non-interference also through a structural analysis of
programs, through so-called Program Dependency Graphs
(PDGs) that capture the program’s control and data flow [43].
In this view, a program is non-interferent if the PDG is free
of paths from high to low memory locations.
Definition 6 (Non-interference under declassification). In the
setting considered in this paper one must assume that the
executed program before encryption already shows interfer-
ence for some memory locations, e.g., because the program is,
in fact, intended to declassify some limited information. Let
us denote by M ↓ C a projection of memory configuration
M onto all (classified) memory locations C that are not
declassified that way. Then even in the setting here it holds
for any program P and any memory configurations M1,M2
that P (M1 ↓ C) =L P (M2 ↓ C).
We next state and prove the main theorem of our con-
struction: that any program that an attacker can produce, and
that would lead to the same computation of labels (and hence
decryptable data) as the original program, cannot produce any
more information flows than the original program.
Theorem 1 (Preservation of non-interference). Let us denote
by tr a program transformation conducted by the attacker, e.g.,
the transformation explained above, which inserted a binary
search. Then, by construction, it holds that:
∀M1,M2, tr : P (M1 ↓ C) =L P (M2 ↓ C)
→ (tr(P ))(M1 ↓ C) =L (tr(P ))(M2 ↓ C)
In other words: disregarding the explicitly declassified in-
formation within C, also the transformed program does not
leak any additional information.
Proof by Contradiction. Assume that Theorem 1 did not hold.
Then there would exist a transformation tr that would cause
the transformed program tr(P ) to compute values in at least
one low memory location despite low-equivalent inputs. But
this is impossible, as any such transformation would necessar-
ily have to insert additional PDG-edges, destroying the label
computations, and hence invalidating the decryptions in our
HASE encryption scheme.
Result Verification: Note that the client can verify the
result of the computation using a simple check on the vari-
able’s label – just as the conversion routine does. The result is
just another variable, which albeit not being converted, can be
checked for correct data flow computation. That way, a client
can ensure that it receives a valid output of the program.
IV. HASE CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, we provide two constructions of HASE
schemes: one homomorphic with respect to multiplication
(Multiplicative HASE) and another with respect to addition
(Additive HASE), on integers.
A. Constructions
Our first construction is based on the renowned public-
key encryption scheme due to Elgamal [17]. We do not
make use of the public-key property of the scheme, but
extend ciphertexts with a third group element working as a
homomorphic authenticator.
Construction 1 (Multiplicative HASE). Let G be a group
generation algorithm and let the DDH problem be hard
relative to G (cf. Definition 8). Define a HASE scheme using
the following PPT algorithms:
• Gen: on input 1λ obtain 〈G, q, g〉 ← G(1λ). For a
pseudorandom function family
H : K × I → G
choose k←$K. Choose a, x, y←$Zq and compute h :=
gx, j := gy . The evaluation key is G, the secret
key is 〈G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, k〉. The plaintext group is
(M,⊕) := (G, ·) where · is the group operation in G.
The ciphertext group is (G3,⊗) where we define ⊗ to
denote the component-wise application of · in G. The
label space is (G, ·).
• Enc: on input a secret key sk = 〈G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, k〉, a
message m ∈ G and an identifier i ∈ I. Choose r←$Zq
and obtain the label l = H(k, i). Compute u := gr,
v := hr ·m and w := jr ·ma · l. Output the ciphertext
〈u, v, w〉.
• Eval: on input an evaluation key G and a set of cipher-
texts C ⊆ C compute the ciphertext
c :=
⊗
c′∈C
c′
and output c.
• Der: on input a secret key 〈G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, k〉 and a
set of identifiers I ⊆ I compute the label
l :=
∏
i∈I
H(k, i)
and output l. Note that here Π denotes the repeated
application of the group operation · in G.
• Dec: on input a secret key 〈G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, k〉, a
ciphertext c = 〈u, v, w〉 and a secret label l ∈ G. First
compute m := u−x · v, then t := uy ·ma · l. If t equals
w output m, otherwise output ⊥.
It is well known that the Elgamal encryption scheme is ho-
momorphic with regard to the group operation in G. As can be
easily seen, this property is inherited by our construction. For
the original Elgamal scheme, G is most commonly instantiated
either as Gq , the q-order subgroup of quadratic residues of
Z∗p for some prime p = 2q + 1 (with q also prime), or as
an elliptic curve over some q-order finite field. In the latter
case, the group operation is elliptic curve point addition and
the ability to perform it in a homomorphism serves no useful
purpose in our context. Instantiating G as Gq on the other
hand enables homomorphic multiplication on the integers.
Our second construction supports homomorphic integer
addition and is obtained by applying a technique proposed by
Hu et al. [26] to the construction presented above. The basic
idea is to consider plaintexts to be element of Zq instead of G
and to encrypt a given plaintext m by first raising the generator
g to the power of m and then encrypting the resulting group
element in the usual way. In detail, this means computing
ciphertexts of the form 〈gr, hrgm〉 rather than 〈gr, hrm〉. To
see that the resulting scheme is homomorphic with regard
to addition on Zq , consider what happens when the group
operation is applied component-wise to two ciphertexts:
〈gr1 · gr2 , hr1gm1 · hr2gm2〉 = 〈gr1+r2 , hr1+r2 · gm1+m2〉
Unfortunately, decryption now involves computing discrete
logarithms with respect to base g, which must be difficult for
sufficiently large exponents in order for the DDH problem
to be hard relative to G. Hu et al. keep exponents small
enough for discrete logarithm algorithms to terminate within
reasonable time despite their exponential asymptotic runtime.
They do so by unambiguously decomposing plaintexts m
into t smaller plaintexts me (e ∈ [1, t]) via means of the
Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) and then encrypting each
me separately. Although doing so increases the ciphertext size
roughly by a factor of t in comparison to Construction 1, this
drawback can be compensated by instantiating G as an elliptic
curve group since the homomorphic operation is on Zq rather
than G. At a comparable security level, group elements of
elliptic curves can be represented using a fraction of bits [39].
We provide the full details of our Additive HASE construc-
tion in the following. Note how the authenticator only requires
constant (i.e., independent of t) ciphertext space and can be
verified without discrete logarithm computation. Although we
consider instantiating G as an elliptic curve group, we keep
writing the group operation multiplicatively (cf. Section II-B).
Construction 2 (Additive HASE). Let G be a group gen-
eration algorithm as before. Define a HASE scheme using
the following PPT algorithms and the Eval algorithm from
Construction 1:
• Gen: on input 1λ obtain 〈G, q, g〉 ← G(1λ). For a
pseudorandom function family
H : K × I → Zq
choose k←$K. Choose {d1, . . . , dt} ⊂ Z+ such that
d :=
∏t
e=1 de < q and ∀e 6= j : gcd(de, dj) = 1. Define
D := 〈d1, . . . , dt, d〉. Choose a, x, y←$Zq and compute
h := gx, j := gy . The evaluation key is G, the secret
key is 〈G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, k,D〉. The plaintext group is
(M,⊕) := (Zd,+). The ciphertext group is (G2(t+1),⊗)
where ⊗ denotes the component-wise application of · in
G. The label space is (G, ·).
• Enc: on input a secret key sk = 〈G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, k,
D〉, a message m ∈ Zd and an identifier i ∈ I. Obtain
the label l := H(k, i).
For e := 1, . . . , t:
– Compute me := m mod de.
– Choose re←$Zq
– Compute ue := gre
– Compute ve := hre · gme
Choose r←$Zq . Compute s := gr and w := jr · gma · l.
Output the ciphertext 〈u1, v1, . . . , ut, vt, s, w〉.
• Der: on input a secret key 〈G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, k,D〉 and
a set of identifiers I ⊆ I compute the label
l :=
∏
i∈I
gH(k,i)
and output l.
• Dec: on input a secret key 〈G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, k,D〉,
a ciphertext 〈u1, v1, . . . , ut, vt, s, w〉 and a secret label
l ∈ G. Parse D = 〈d1, . . . , dt, d〉. First compute me :=
logg(veue
−x) for e = 1, . . . , t, then recover
m :=
t∑
e=1
me
d
de
(
d
de
−1
mod de
)
mod d.
If sy · gma · l = w then output m, else output ⊥. Note
that logg denotes the discrete logarithm with respect to
base g.
B. Security Reductions
We define the assumptions and security the HASE schemes
provide under these assumptions. However, in order to main-
tain the page limit proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
Definition 7 (Pseudorandom Function). Let X and Y be two
finite sets and denote the set of all functions from X to Y as F .
We say that an efficiently computable keyed function F : K×
X → Y with keyspace K is a pseudorandom function (PRF), if
for all PPT algorithmsA there is a negligible function negl(λ)
such that:∣∣∣Pr[AF (k,·)(1λ) = 1]− Pr[Af(·)(1λ) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ)
where the first probability is taken over k←$K and the second
probability is taken over f ←$F .
Definition 8 (DDH Problem [29]). Let G be a PPT algorithm
taking 1λ as input and outputting 〈G, q, g〉 where G is a
description of a cyclic group, q is the order of G and g is
a generator of G. We say that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) problem is hard relative to G if for all PPT algorithms
A there is a negligible function negl(λ) such that:∣∣∣Pr[A(G, q, g, gα, gβ , gγ) = 1]−
Pr
[A(G, q, g, gα, gβ , gαβ) = 1] ∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ)
where in each case the probabilities are taken over the experi-
ment in which G(1λ) outputs 〈G, q, g〉, and then α, β, γ←$Zq .
Theorem 2 (Multiplicative HASE-IND-CPA). Let Π be Con-
struction 1. If the DDH problem is hard relative to G and H
is a PRF as described in Π.Gen, then Π is CPA-secure.
Theorem 3 (Multiplicative HASE-UF-CPA). Let Π be Con-
struction 1. If H is a PRF as described in Π.Gen, then Π is
unforgeable.
Lemma 1 (Additive HASE-IND-CPA). Let Π be Construc-
tion 2. If the DDH problem is hard relative to G and H is a
PRF as described in Π.Gen, then Π is CPA-secure.
Lemma 2 (Additive HASE-UF-CPA). Let Π be Construc-
tion 2. If H is a PRF as described in Π.Gen, then Π is
unforgeable.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present implementation details used in
the subsequent evaluation section. Recall from Section II-A
that we consider a scenario between a trusted client and an
untrusted cloud server (which has a Trusted Module) and we
distinguish two phases of the outsourced computation: setup
and runtime.
A. Setup Phase
In Figure 3, we present the setup phase in more detail.
Compilation: First, the client translates any Java bytecode
program to a bytecode program running on encrypted data.
To start, the client generates a set of cryptographic keys for
our HASE encryption. It then uses our Bytecode-to-Bytecode
Compiler to transform an application (in the form of Java
bytecode) using the Generated Keys (1). Our compiler is based
on Soot, “a framework for analyzing and transforming Java and
Android Applications” [31].
Our implementation uses a Crypto Library to encrypt
program constants and choose variable labels (2-3). The
crypto library contains implementations of all cryptographic
algorithms, including our own cryptographic algorithms from
Section IV. It implements the PRF used for the authentication
labels as HMAC-SHA256 [16]. For the group operations in
Multiplicative HASE we use the MPIR (Multiple Precision
Integers and Rationals) library [2] for large integer arithmetic.
Additive HASE operates on the elliptic curve group provided
by libsodium [4]. The Gen method of Additive HASE has
as parameters the number of ciphertext components and the
number of bits per component. From these, it deterministically
derives a set of primes {d1, . . . , dt}. The Additive HASE
Dec method computes the discrete logarithms using exhaustive
search with a fixed set of precomputed values.
Our compiler converts floating-point plaintexts to a fixed-
point representation by an application-defined scaling factor. It
also transforms the calculations to integer values, whereby the
scaling factors are considered when appropriate. The resulting
value is transformed back to floating point after decryption.
The compiler then performs the transformation described in
Section III and outputs a Main Class containing the program
start code, multiple App Classes containing the remaining code
and Conversion Data (e.g., labels and comparison parame-
ters) (4).
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Figure 3. Application Transformation during setup phase. See Section V-A for a full description.
Deployment: Second, the client deploys the app classes
at the cloud server and securely loads the generated crypto-
graphic keys and conversion data into the Trusted Module. We
implemented the Trusted Module using an Intel SGX enclave.
SGX is well suited for our implementation, because it provides
the following features we require: remote attestation, secure
data storage and isolated program execution. It is available
in every Intel processor beginning at the Skylake generation
making it a widely available Trusted Module. Using the remote
attestation feature of SGX the client prepares the enclave (refer
to [6] for details). This feature allows to verify the correct
creation of an enclave in a remote system and – in our case
– the correct setup of the crypto library. Additionally, SGX’s
remote attestation provides means to establish a secure channel
between an external party and an enclave, over which we
transfer the sensitive conversion data to the untrusted cloud
server. We emphasize that the cryptographic keys and the
conversion data is protected from access by any software
except the enclave by SGX’s hardware protection.
B. Runtime Phase
To run the program, the client executes the main class which
triggers the remote program execution at the cloud server (see
Figure 4). The main class encrypts the Program Input (for this
run of the program) with the generated keys (for the entire
setup of the program) using the crypto library (1-4).
The main class passes the Encrypted Input to the app
classes on the cloud server (5). The app classes operate on
encrypted data and do not have any additional protection. They
invoke the DFAuth Wrapper for operations on homomorphic
ciphertexts and re-encryption or comparison requests to the
Trusted Module (6). The DFAuth wrapper hides the specific
homomorphic encryption schemes and Trusted Module im-
plementation details in data flow authentication from the app
classes. The wrapper forwards re-encryption and comparison
requests to the Trusted Module and passes the answers back
to the application (7-9).
Once the app classes have finished their computation, they
send an encrypted result (including an authentication label)
back to the client (10). The client verifies the authentication
label to the one computed by our compiler.
The task of the Trusted Module during runtime is to receive
re-encryption and comparison requests, determine whether
they are legitimate and answer them if they are. It bundles
cryptographic keys, authentication labels and required parts
of the crypto library inside a trusted area shielding it from
unauthorized access. The DFAuth wrapper enables to poten-
tially select different Trusted Modules based on the client’s
security and feature requirements and their availability at the
cloud server. Besides Intel SGX enclaves, one can implement
a Trusted Module using a hypervisor or calling back to the
client for sensitive operations.
SGX’s secure random number generator provides the ran-
dom values required during encryption. A restriction of the
current generation of Intel SGX is the limited size of its
isolated memory. It only provides about 96 MB for code and
data and thus gives an upper bound for precomputed discrete
logarithm values used to speedup Additive HASE. Exhaustive
search is still possible, but our experiments showed that it is
severely slower. The available memory can be used optimally
with a careful selection of CRT parameters.
Re-encryption and comparison requests have to be im-
plemented inside the Trusted Module. We display the con-
version routines (implemented in an SGX enclave in our
case) for conversion to multiplicative homomorphic encryption
and comparison in Listings 3 and 4. The conversion routine
to additively homomorphic encryption is similar to the one
for multiplicative encryption in Listing 3 with the roles of
the encryption schemes switched. The comparison of two
encrypted values is similar to the comparison of one to a
constant in Listing 4. Similar to the call labelLookup,
which retrieves labels from conversion data stored inside the
Trusted Module, idLookup and paramLookup retrieve
identifiers for encryption and parameters for comparison from
the conversion data.
Listing 3. Conversion to multiplicative HE
1 convertToMul(x, "x") {
2 label = labelLookup("x");
3 y = Dec(K, x, label);
4 if (y == fail)
5 stop;
6 id = idLookup("x");
7 return Enc(K, y, id);
8 }
Listing 4. Conversion to comparison
1 convertToCmp(x, y, "x") {
2 label = labelLookup("x");
3 x1 = Dec(K, x, label);
4 if (x1 == fail)
5 stop;
6 if (y == null) {
7 param = paramLookup("x");
8 switch (param.type) {
9 case EQ:
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Figure 4. Application Execution during Runtime Phase. See Section V-B for a full description.
10 return (x1 == param.const);
11 case GT:
12 return (x1 > param.const);
13 case GTE:
14 ...
15 } else {
16 label = labelLookup("y");
17 y1 = Dec(K, y, label);
18 if (y1 == fail)
19 stop;
20 ...
21 }
22 }
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we present the evaluation results collected
in two experiments. In our first experiment, we apply DFAuth
to a checkout (shopping cart) component of a Secure Sales
Application, which we developed ourselves. In our second
experiment, we use DFAuth to transform an existing neural
network program enabling Secure Neural Networks in the
Cloud.
All experiments were performed on an Intel Core i7-
6700 CPU with 64 GB RAM running Windows 10. For the
evaluation, we aimed for a security level equivalent to 80
bits of symmetric encryption security. We used the 1536-bit
MODP Group from RFC3526 [30] as the underlying group
in Multiplicative HASE. The libsodium [4] elliptic curve
group used by Additive HASE even provides a security level
of 128 bits [10].
A. Secure Sales Application
In this experiment, we consider the checkout component
of a secure sales application running at an untrusted server.
When a client wants to checkout a shopping cart, the server is
tasked with summing up the encrypted prices of all items in
the cart. Additionally, discounts need to be applied when the
sum exceeds certain thresholds.
In this application we want to protect the discount structure
of the client, i.e., the thresholds when discounts are applied and
the percentage of the discount. This is important in outsourced
shopping applications, because an attacker, e.g., a co-residing
competitor, could try to infer the discount structure in order
to gain an unfair advantage in the market.
Experimental Setup: We implemented this checkout com-
ponent and applied DFAuth to it. If the sum exceeds the value
of $500, we grant a total discount of 10%. If the sum exceeds
the value of $250, our implementation grants a discount of
5%.
In order to evaluate the performance of the original (plain-
text) and the DFAuth variant of the program, we built shopping
carts of sizes {1, 10, . . . , 100}. Prices were taken uniformly
at random from the interval [0.01, 1000.00]. For each cart a
plaintext and an encrypted variant is stored at the untrusted
server.
For each of the two program variants, the total runtime
of code executing at the untrusted server was measured. The
total runtime includes reading the corresponding shopping cart
data from disk, summing up the prices of all items in the
cart and granting discounts where applicable. For the DFAuth
variant, we also collected the number of operations performed
on encrypted data inside and outside of the Trusted Module, as
well as the time spent invoking and inside the Trusted Module.
Our measurements do not include the setup phase, because
it is only a one-time overhead that amortizes over multiple
runs. Furthermore, we do not include network latency in our
measurements, since the difference in communication between
a program running on plaintext and a program running on
encrypted data is very small.
Evaluation Results: There are three cases for the control
flow in the secure sales application:
• Case 1: The sum of all item prices neither reaches the
first threshold nor the second threshold. In this case, the
sum of the prices is compared to two different threshold
constants.
• Case 2: The sum of all prices reaches the larger threshold.
In this case, the sum is compared to one threshold
constant and needs to be converted to Multiplicative
HASE before being multiplied with the respective dis-
count constant.
• Case 3: The sum of all prices reaches the lower threshold,
but not the larger threshold. In this case, the sum is
compared to two threshold constants and needs to be
converted to Multiplicative HASE before being multiplied
with the respective discount constant.
Figure 5 presents the average runtime results of 100 runs
of the experiment described above for Case 3. We can see
that even for large-sized carts, which contain 100 items, the
slowdown caused by the introduction of DFAuth is only
about a factor of 3. Assuming a roundtrip latency of at least
33 ms (which can be considered realistic according to [1]),
the slowdown decreases to a factor of 1.3 at most. Most
importantly, the absolute runtime values are sufficiently low
for online computation in a practical deployment.
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Figure 5. Average runtime [ms] of the original (left) and DFAuth (right)
variants of the shopping cart program as a function of the cart size for Case 3.
We do not show the 95% confidence interval, because even the largest value
is only ± 0.003ms, which would not be visible in the graph.
Table I
COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF UNTRUSTED OPERATIONS AND
TRUSTED OPERATIONS ON ENCRYPTED DATA CALLED BY THE SECURE
SALES APPLICATION EXPERIMENT FOR SHOPPING CART SIZE 10.
Untrusted HASE Operations Trusted Operations (SGX)
Functionality # Ops Functionality # Ops
Hom. Addition Additive to MultiplicativeHASE Conversion
Case 1: 9 Case 1: 0
Case 2: 9 Case 2: 1
Case 3: 9 Case 3: 1
Hom. Multiplication Comparison to Constant
Case 1: 0 Case 1: 2
Case 2: 1 Case 2: 1
Case 3: 1 Case 3: 2
Total Total
Case 1: 9 Case 1: 2
Case 2: 10 Case 2: 2
Case 3: 10 Case 3: 3
From Figure 5 we can also see that a significant portion
of the total runtime is spent inside (or invoking) the Trusted
Module. On the one hand, this shows that a more efficient
Trusted Module implementation would significantly decrease
the total runtime of the application. On the other hand, it
suggests that we execute more instructions inside the Trusted
Module than outside (contradicting our basic idea of a reduced
execution inside the Trusted Module). However, Table I, which
reports the number of operations performed on encrypted data
inside and outside of the Trusted Module, shows that this
is not the case. Even for a shopping cart containing only
10 items, there are 9 to 10 untrusted HASE operations, but
only 1 to 3 trusted operations. While the number of trusted
operations is independent of the shopping cart size, the number
of untrusted HASE operations is approximately linear in the
shopping cart size, i.e., an even larger shopping cart size would
further increase the fraction of untrusted HASE operations.
B. Secure Neural Networks in the Cloud
In this experiment, we consider the use case of evaluating
neural networks in the cloud. Due to their computational
complexity, it is desirable to outsource neural network com-
putations to powerful computing machinery located at a cloud
service provider.
In this application we want to protect the neural network
model and the instance classified, i.e., the weights of the
connections and the inputs and outputs of the neurons. The
weights do not change between classifications and often rep-
resent intellectual property of the client. Also the privacy
of a user classified in the neural network is at risk, since
his classification may be revealed. Our DFAuth mechanism
overcomes these concerns, because it encrypts the weights in
the network and the client’s input and performs only encrypted
calculations. Note that even the classification does not leak,
since the result returned is the output values for each of the
classification neurons, i.e., a chance of classification y, e.g.,
breast cancer in our subsequent example, of x%.
Experimental Setup: We apply our transformation to the
BrestCancerSample [sic] neural network provided by Neuroph
[3], a framework for neural networks. Given a set of features
extracted from an image of a breast tumour, the BrestCancer-
Sample neural network predicts whether the tumour is ma-
lignant or benign. As such, the network operates on highly
sensitive medical data.
The properties of the neural network (e.g., layer and neuron
configuration) are encoded programmatically in the Main
Class of this network. This class also reads the data set
associated with the network and divides it into a 70% training
set and a 30% test set. The training set is used to learn the
network, the test set is used to evaluate whether the network
delivers correct predictions.
We start by applying our DFAuth mechanism to the Main
Class of the network and the classes of the framework (App
Classes). Result of the transformation is a new Main Class
and a set of App Classes operating on ciphertexts rather than
floating-point double values. Floating-point numbers are con-
verted to fixed-point numbers by scaling by a factor of 106. We
use the facilities provided by Neuroph to serialize the trained
neural network weights into a double array and encrypt each
weight using HASE. The encrypted weights and the neural
network configuration form the encrypted neural network. We
exploit Neuroph to write the encrypted neural network to disk
just like the original one operating on plaintext.
For both – the plaintext and encrypted neural net-
work – we test 11 different network evaluation sizes
({1, 10, 20, . . . , 100}) and perform 20 runs each. For every
run, a new random segmentation of training and test data is
done and the network is trained again. Inputs to the neural
network are sampled uniformly at random (without replace-
ment) from the test data set. As in the previous experiment, we
measured the total runtime of code executing at the untrusted
server, the time spent invoking and inside the Trusted Module,
the number of operations performed on encrypted data inside
and outside of the Trusted Module. The total runtime includes
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Figure 6. Average total runtime [s] of the DFAuth variant of the breast cancer
neural network experiment as a function of the number of evaluations. We do
not show the 95% confidence interval, because even the largest value is only
± 0.02 s, which would not be visible in the graph. For the same reason, we
do not include the plaintext measurements.
reading the network configuration (i.e., layers and neuron),
building the network, loading the weights and executing the
network evaluation.
Evaluation Results: We present the evaluation results of
the encrypted neural network in Figure 6. The total runtime of
one network evaluation is only 0.86 s, whereby 0.84 s (98%)
are spend in the Trusted Module (SGX) and 0.02 s (2%) on the
cloud server, but outside of the Trusted Module. Even for 100
evaluations the run completes in 85.96 s on average. In this
case, the processing time in the Trusted Module is 84.39 s
(98%) and 1.56 s (2%) outside. The relative runtime of an
evaluation (total runtime / number of network evaluations) is
constant at about 860 ms with a 95% confidence interval of
+− 0.42 ms. Clearly, a user can wait online for the output of
a neural network evaluation on encrypted data in a practical
deployment. It is important to note that for each run and
every input, the prediction of the encrypted network was
consistent with the prediction of the plaintext network, i.e., we
introduce no additional error due to the encrypted computation.
Compared to one plaintext network evaluation, we introduce
a slowdown of about 677.
As in the previous experiment, a large portion of the total
runtime is spend inside the Trusted Module. Table II reports
the number of untrusted operations and number of Trusted
Module operations. For a single neural network evaluation,
1096 untrusted operations and 620 trusted operations on
encrypted data are performed. This means that 64% of all
operations on encrypted can be performed directly using ho-
momorphic encryption, without involving the Trusted Module.
Comparison to Alternative Solutions: Recently, imple-
mentations of machine learning on encrypted data have been
presented for somewhat homomorphic encryption [22] and In-
tel’s SGX [35]. Compared to the implementation on somewhat
homomorphic encryption our approach offers the following
advantages:
• Our approach has a latency of 0.86 seconds compared to
570 seconds for somewhat homomorphic encryption. The
Table II
COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF UNTRUSTED OPERATIONS AND
TRUSTED OPERATIONS ON ENCRYPTED DATA CALLED FOR A SINGLE
EVALUATION OF THE NEURAL NETWORK.
Untrusted HASE Operations Trusted Operations (SGX)
Functionality # Ops Functionality # Ops
Hom. Addition 548 Additive to MultiplicativeHASE Conversion 36
Hom. Multiplication 548 Multiplicative to AdditiveHASE Conversion 548
Comparison to Constant 36
Total 1096 Total 620
implementation in [22] exploits the inherent parallelism
of somewhat homomorphic encryption in order to achieve
a high throughput. However, when evaluating only one
sample on the neural network the latency is large. Our
approach is capable of evaluating only a single sample
with low latency as well.
• Our approach scales to different machine learning tech-
niques with minimal developer effort. Whereas the al-
gorithms in [22] were specifically developed for a type
of neural network, our implementation on encrypted data
was derived from an existing implementation of neural
networks on plaintext data by compilation. This also im-
plies that the error introduced by [22] due to computation
on integers does not apply in our case. However, we have
not evaluated this aspect of accuracy in comparison to
[22].
• Our approach is capable of outsourcing a neural net-
work evaluation whereas the approach in [22] is a two-
party protocol, i.e., the weights of the neural network
are known to the server. Our approach encrypts the
weights of the neural network and hence a client can
outsource the computation of neural network. Note that
our approach includes the functionality of evaluating on
plaintext weights as well and hence offers the larger
functionality.
Although their runtime overhead is smaller than ours, our
approach offers the following advantage compared to the
implementation on Intel’s SGX [35]: In our approach the
code in the SGX enclave is independent of the function-
ality, e.g., machine learning. The implementation in [35]
provides a new, specific algorithm for each additional ma-
chine learning function, i.e., neural networks, decision trees,
etc. Each implementation has been specifically optimized to
avoid side channels on SGX and hopefully scrutinized for
software vulnerabilities. The same development effort has been
applied once to our conversion routines and crypto library
running in the Trusted Module. However, when adding a new
functionality our approach only requires compiling the source
program and not applying the same effort again on the new
implementation.
VII. RELATED WORK
Our work is related to (homomorphic) authenticated encryp-
tion and computation over encrypted data – including but not
limited to homomorphic encryption.
(Homomorphic) Authenticated Encryption: Authenti-
cated Encryption (AE) is an encryption mode that provides
confidentiality as well as authenticity (unforgeability) and is
the recommended security notion for symmetric encryption
schemes. Classically, AE is achieved by composing an en-
cryption scheme providing confidentiality with a message au-
thentication code providing authenticity. Recent, more efficient
encryption schemes provide both properties out of the box,
e.g., Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
An AE can be obtained by composing an IND-CPA secure
encryption scheme with a signature or message authentication
code (MAC) [8]. Hence, one can obtain a homomorphic
AE by combining a homomorphic encryption scheme with
a homomorphic MAC. However, since the best known homo-
morphic MACs [19] are not yet fully homomorphic a different
construction is required. Joo and Yun provide the first fully
homomorphic AE [27]. However, their decryption algorithm
is as complex as the evaluation done on homomorphic cipher-
texts undermining the advantages of an encrypted programs,
i.e., one could do the entire computation in the Trusted
Module. In parallel work, Barbosa et al. develop labeled
homomorphic encryption [7] which, however, has not been
applied to Trusted Modules. Our goal is to separate between
an encrypted program space and small, Trusted Module.
Boneh et al. [11] introduced linearly homomorphic signa-
tures and MACs in order to support the efficiency gain by
network coding. However, their signatures were still deter-
ministic, hence not achieving IND-CPA security. Catalano et
al. [14] integrated MACs into efficient, linearly homomorphic
Paillier encryption [36] and used identifiers in order to support
public verifiability, i.e., verification without knowledge of the
plaintext. However, their scheme also has linear verification
time undermining the advantages of a small Trusted Module.
In our HASE construction we aimed for using identifiers and
not plaintext values in order to enable data flow authentication.
Furthermore, we split verification into a pre-computed deriva-
tion phase and a verification phase. Hence, we can achieve
constant time verification.
Aggregate MACs [28] provide support for aggregation of
MACs from distinct keys. However, our current data flow
authentication considers one client and secret key.
Computation over Encrypted Data: Since fully homo-
morphic encryption [20] provides rather disappointing per-
formance [21] researchers have resorted to partially encrypt-
ing computations. MrCrypt [41] infers feasible encryption
schemes using type inference. In addition to homomorphic
encryption, MrCrypt makes use of randomized and determin-
istic order-preserving encryption. However, the set of feasible
programs is limited and the authors only evaluate it on shallow
MapReduce program snippets. Even, in this case several test
cases cannot be executed. JCrypt [15] improved the type
inference algorithm to a larger set of programs. However, still
no conversions between encryption schemes were performed.
AutoCrypt [42] used these conversion, however, realized
their security implications. The authors hence disallowed any
conversion from homomorphic encryption to searchable en-
cryption. This restriction prevents any program from running
that modifies its input and then performs a control flow
decision. Such programs include the arithmetic computations
we performed in our evaluation.
Next to programs written in imperative programming lan-
guages, such as Java, programs in declarative languages,
such as SQL are amenable to encrypted computation. In a
declarative language, the programmer does not specify the
control flow decisions, but they may be re-ordered (optimized)
by the interpreter or compiler. Hence any resulting data and
information is admissible and weaker encryption schemes
must be used. Hacigümüs et al. used deterministic encryption
to implement a large subset of SQL [24]. Popa et al. used also
randomized and order-preserving encryption in an adjustable
manner [37].
Verifiable computation [18] can be used by a client to check
whether a server performed a computation as intended – even
on encrypted data. However, this does not prevent the attacks
by malicious adversaries considered in this paper. It only
proves that the server performed one correct computation, but
not that it did not perform any others.
Functional encryption [12] is a more powerful computation
on encrypted data than homomorphic encryption. It not only
can compute any function, but also reveal the result of the
computation and not only its ciphertext. However, generic
constructions [23] are even slower than homomorphic encryp-
tion. Searchable encryption [40] is a special case of functional
encryption for comparisons. It could be used to implement
comparisons in data flow authentication. However, since the
actual comparison time is so insignificant compared to the
cryptographic operations, it is more efficient to implement
comparison in the Trusted Module as well.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We introduce the concept of data flow authentication
(DFAuth) which prevents an active adversary from deviating
from the data flow in an outsourced program. This in turn
allows to safely use re-encryptions between homomorphic and
leaking encryption schemes in order to allow a larger class of
programs to run on encrypted data where only the executed
control flow is leaked to the adversary. Our implementation of
DFAuth uses a novel authenticated, homomorphic encryption
scheme and Trusted Modules in an Intel’s SGX enclave.
Compared to an implementation solely on fully homomorphic
encryption we offer better and actually practical performance
and compared to an implementation solely on Intel’s SGX we
offer a much smaller trusted code base independent of the
protected application. We underpin these results by an imple-
mentation of a bytecode-to-bytecode compiler that translates
Java programs into Java programs on encrypted data using
DFAuth.
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APPENDIX
A. Postponed Security Reductions
1) Proof of Theorem 2 (HASE-IND-CPA):
Proof. Let Π,G, H be as described and let A be a PPT
adversary. We use a sequence of games to show that A’s
advantage AdvIND-CPAA,Π (λ) is negligible in λ. For Game n we
use Sn to denote the event that b = b′. The final game and
the encryption oracle used in all games are given in Figure 7.
Game 0. This is the original experiment from Defini-
tion 3 except that instead of relying on Π the challenger
performs the exact same computations on its own. Clearly,
AdvIND-CPAA,Π (λ) = |Pr[S0 ]− 12 |.
Game 1 (Indistinguishability-Based Transition). Instead
of deriving the label used in the third component of the
challenge ciphertext using the pseudorandom function H : K×
I → G for some random k←$K, we make use of a random
function f ←$F from the set of functions F = {F : I → G}.
We construct a polynomial time algorithm B distinguishing
between a PRF (for a random key) and a random function
using A as a black box. If B’s oracle is a pseudorandom
function, then the view of A is distributed as in Game 0
and we have Pr[S0 ] = Pr
[BA,H(k,·)(1λ) = 1] for some
k←$K. If B’s oracle is a random function, then the view
of A is distributed as in Game 1 and thus we have Pr[S1 ] =
Pr
[BA,f(·)(1λ) = 1] for some f ←$F . Under the assumption
that H is a PRF, |Pr[S0 ]− Pr[S1 ] | is negligible.
Game 2 (Conceptual Transition). Because f is only
evaluated on a single input i and f is a random function, the
result is a random element of G. Thus, instead of computing
l := f(i), we can compute l := gs for a random exponent
s←$Zq . Since this is only a conceptual change, we have
Pr[S1 ] = Pr[S2 ].
Game 3 (Indistinguishability-Based Transition). In the
challenge ciphertext we replace hr = gxr with a random group
element gz generated by raising g to the power of a random
z←$Zq .
We construct a polynomial time distinguishing algorithm
D solving the DDH problem that interpolates between Game
2 and Game 3. If D receives a real triple (gα, gβ , gαβ)
for α, β←$Zq , then A operates on a challenge ciphertext
constructed as in Game 2 and thus we have
Pr[S2 ] = Pr
[DA(G, q, g, gα, gβ , gαβ) = 1] .
If D receives a random triple (gα, gβ , gγ) for α, β, γ←$Zq ,
then A operates on a challenge ciphertext constructed as in
Game 3 and thus we have
Pr[S3 ] = Pr
[DA(G, q, g, gα, gβ , gγ) = 1] .
In both cases D receives 〈G, q, g〉 output by G(1λ). Under
the assumption that the DDH problem is hard relative to G,
|Pr[S2 ]− Pr[S3 ] | is negligible.
Game3
IND-CPA
A (λ)
S := {}
〈G, q, g〉 ← G(1λ)
a, x, y←$Zq, k←$K
h := gx, j := gy
ek := G
sk := 〈G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, k〉
〈m0,m1, i, st〉 ← AEsk (1λ, ek)
if i ∈ pi2(S) then
return 0
else
b←$ {0, 1}
S := S ∪ {(mb, i)}
r, s , z ←$Zq, l := gs
c :=
〈
gr, gz ·mb, jr ·mba · l
〉
b′ ← AEsk (1λ, c, st)
return b = b′
Esk(m, i)
parse sk = 〈G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, k〉
if i ∈ pi2(S) then
return ⊥
else
S := S ∪ {(m, i)}
r←$Zq, l := H(k, i)
c := 〈gr, hr ·m, jr ·ma · l〉
return c
Figure 7. Final security experiment used in HASE-IND-CPA proof. Changes
compared to the first experiment are highlighted.
Conclusion. In the last game, the first component of the
challenge ciphertext is trivially independent of the challenge
plaintext as well as the challenge identifier. In the second
component, gz acts like a one-time pad and completely hides
mb. Similarly, l = gs acts like a one-time pad in the third
component. Because the challenge ciphertext does not contain
any information about mb or i, we conclude that Pr[S3 ] = 12 .
Overall we have that AdvIND-CPAA,Π (λ) = negl(λ).
2) Proof of Theorem 3 (HASE-UF-CPA):
Proof. Let Π,G, H be as described and let A be a PPT
adversary. We use a sequence of games to show that A’s
advantage AdvUF-CPAA,Π (λ) is negligible in λ. For Game n we
use Sn to denote the event that the adversary wins the game.
The final game is illustrated in Figure 8.
Game 0. This is the original experiment from Defini-
tion 4 except that instead of relying on Π the challenger
performs the exact same computations on its own. Clearly,
AdvUF-CPAA,Π (λ) = |Pr[S0 ] |.
Game 1 (Conceptual Transition). We eliminate the condi-
tional statement by comparing t and w in the return statement.
Game 2 (Indistinguishability-Based Transition). We re-
place the pseudorandom function H(k, ·) with a function f(·)
chosen at random. Under the assumption that H is a PRF, we
have that |Pr[S1 ] − Pr[S2 ] | is negligible as in the previous
security reduction in Theorem 2.
Conclusion. We show that Pr[S2 ] = negl(λ). Let X be the
event that ∀i ∈ I : ∃(m, i) ∈ S, i.e., all identifiers have been
used in encryption oracle queries.
In case event X does not happen, the challenger evaluates
function f on at least one new argument. By the definition
of f , the result is a random value in the image of f . This
random group element acts as a one-time pad and makes l
look random. Subsequently, t is also random from the point of
view of the adversary. To win the experiment, A has to fulfill
t = w. Because t is random, A can not guess the correct w
with probability better than 1q . Thus, we have
Pr[S2 ∧ ¬X ] = 1
q
· Pr[¬X ] . (1)
Recall that q is the order of G (of which w is an element) and
both are output by the group generation algorithm G(1λ). Also
note that ¬X holds when A performs no encryption queries
at all.
Now consider the case when event X happens and let 〈c, I〉
be the output of the adversary. The set of identifiers I deter-
mines a label l and an expected message m˜. Furthermore, let
c˜ = 〈u˜, v˜, w˜〉 be the ciphertext resulting from the application
of Π.Eval to ciphertexts identified by I . As c˜ is an honestly
derived encryption of m˜, the following must hold:
m˜ = u˜−x · v˜
w˜ = u˜y · m˜a · l
= (u˜y−x · v˜)a · l (2)
Similary, in order for c = 〈u, v, w〉 to be accepted as a forgery
regarding I , it must hold that:
w = (uy−x · v)a · l (3)
for some m := u−x · v 6= m˜. Because m 6= m˜ we know that
u˜y−x · v˜ 6= uy−x · v and w˜ 6= w.
Combining equations (2) and (3) yields
w˜
w
=
(u˜y−x · v˜)a · l
(uy−x · v)a · l
=
(
u˜y−x · v˜
uy−x · v
)a
(4)
In order for c to be a forgery with regard to I , equation (4)
needs to be satisfied. But since a is a random element of Zq ,
the probability that A can satisfy (4) is only 1q . Hence,
Pr[S2 ∧X ] = 1
q
· Pr[X ] . (5)
Summing up (1) and (5), we have
Pr[S2 ] = Pr[S2 ∧ ¬X ] + Pr[S2 ∧X ] = 1
q
and overall we have that AdvUF-CPAA,Π (λ) = negl(λ)
Game2
UF-CPA
A,G,H (λ)
S := {}
〈G, q, g〉 ← G(1λ)
a, x, y←$Zq, k←$K, f ←$F
h := gx, j := gy
ek := G
sk :=
〈
G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, f
〉
〈c, I〉 ← AEsk (1λ, ek)
l :=
∏
i∈I
f(i)
parse c = 〈u, v, w〉
m := u−x · v
t := uy ·ma · l
m˜ :=
⊕
(m′,i)∈S,i∈I
m′
return t = w ∧m 6= m˜
Esk(m, i)
parse sk =
〈
G, q, g, a, x, y, h, j, f
〉
if i ∈ pi2(S) then
return ⊥
else
S := S ∪ {(m, i)}
r←$Zq, l := f(i)
c := 〈gr, hr ·m, jr ·ma · l〉
return c
Figure 8. Final security experiment used in HASE-UF-CPA proof. Changes
compared to the first experiment are highlighted.
3) Proof of Lemmata 1 and 2:
Proof (Sketch). The security of Construction 2 (Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2) follows directly from the security of Construction 1
(Theorem 2 and Theorem 3).
